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SUBDIVISION EXACTIONS AND ACCESS
TO PUBLIC BEACHES

Public beaches cannot be enjoyed by the
nation's.titizens unless there is suffici- -t
access for the public to the shorefront.
Construction and development on the privately
owned land parallelling public beaches can
hinder access to the shore unless proper provision is Made for public access through this
private property. The problem of ensuring
sufficient access to public beaches has grown
in recent years with the increasing demand
for vacation homes in resort areas. Where
development has already occurred, the only
alternative is for the condemnation and public purchase of easements or lands in fee for
the required access routes. While the Coastal
*Zone Management Act provides in sec. 315(2)
for the federal funding of up to one half of
the cost of "acquiring lands for access to
public beaches and other public coastal areas,,
states and localities may find it difficult to
fund their share of such costs, especially
withrising land prices brought on by increasing demand for shorefront property.
Where development has not yet occurred,
an alternative to public purchase of access
routes may be found in the utilization of the
subdivision exaction. This ideal has been
adopted in California by a recent statute,
Cal. Gov. Code sec. 66478.11. The statute
provides that:
No local agency shall approve either the
.tentative or final map of any subdivision
fronting upon the coastline or shoreline
which subdivision does not provide or have
available reasonable public access by fee
or easement from public highways to land
below the ordinary high water mark on any
ocean coastline or bay shoreline within or
at a reasonable distance from the subdivision.
Subdivision exactions are a product of
the process by which developers gain permission from localities to subdivide their land
for eventual sale and construction. In Virginia, subdivision means "the division of a
parcel of'land into three or more lots or
parcels of less than five acres each for the
purpose of transfer of ownership or building
development, or, if a new street is involved
• . . any division of a parcel of land." Va.
Code Ann. sec. 15.1-4.31(L) (1976 Supp.). Before a developer may subdivide land, he must
comply with certain regulations adopted by
the municipality. Thus, the subdivision exaction is essentially a condition precedent
to the securing of authority to subdivide
land. The California statute represents a
bold advance in the utilization of subdivis

exactions from developers. Ordinarily, a
local government may compel a subdivider to

nave employed the "uniquely attributable"
formula, but have upheld the subdivision
exaction. Billings Properties, Inc. v.
Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d
182 (1964T (parkland), Aunt Hack RideEstates, Inc. v. Planning Commiaon N the
City of Danbury, 160 Conn. 109, 273 A.2d
880 (1970) (park and recreation land).

muTty sewer lines, Stanco v. Suozzi, 11 Misc.
2d 784, 171 N.Y.S.2d 997 (1958), and curbs
and gutters, Petterson v. City of Naperville,

The distinction between the "reasonableness" standard and the "uniquely attributable" standard is essentially one of allocation of the burden of proof. Courts adopting
the "reasonableness" formula imply that the
subdivision of land is "not a right, but a
privilege", placing the burden of demonstriting the "unreasonableness" of the exaction
on the subdivider. The courts which follow
the "uniquely attributable" standard place
the burden of proof on the municipality to
prove that the exaction is not an unconstitutional taking of private property for public
use without just compensation.

provide for utilities within the subdivision
as an exercise of the power to provide for
the public health, safety, and general welfare. For example, a locality may constitutionally require a developer to provide for
water systems, Zastro v. Village of Brown
Deer, 9 Wis.2d 100, 100 N.W. 359 (1960), com9 Ill.2d 233 (1960).

The rationality of such requirements cannot seriously be questioned, as it is clearly
within the public health, safety, and general
welfare to prohibit the subdivision of land
without provision for the utilities essential
to the subdivision. However, a revolution of
sorts occurred after the decision in A res v.
City Council of Los Angeles, 34 Ca1.2c3-7
P.2d 1 (1949), where a subdivider was required
to dedicate land for the widening of a street
even though the increased traffic on the

street was only partially caused by the sub-

division. While it had been generally assumed
that developers could be required to provide

the essential utilities needed by a new subdivision (e.g., streets, water lines and
sewer lines), the court in Ayres permitted the
exaction to occur on a showing that the exaction was "reasonably related" to the needs
of the entire community, and not required
solely by the subdivision. The liberal standard of the Ayres decision was later adopted

by other court t.roughout the country in several decisions upholding the right of localities to compel subdividers to dedicate or
help pay for park and recreation lands, on the
"reasonableness" standard. Jenad v. Villace
of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 240 N.Y.S.2d 955,
218 N.E.2d 673 (1966), Jordan v. illa a of
Menomenee Falls, 23 Wis.2d 608,1l3.N.W447
(1965), Associated Home Builders of Greater
East Bay, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4
Cal.3d 633, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 484 P.2d 606
(1971).

Other courts, however, adopted a more restrictive view, permitting subdivision exacticns only where the need for the subject of
the exaction was "uniquely attributable" to
the subdivision itself. Under this standard,

an exaction requiring a subdivider to set aside land for a school was invalidated as
violative of the Constitutional requirement
*for the compensation of public takings cf
private land in Pioneer Trust and Savinos

Bank v. Villaoe of Mount Prosect, 22 ,il.2d
,'5, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961) . COher Courts

The California beach access statute has
not yet been the subject of a reported decision from that state. Its chances of survival in California appear to be good based cn
the liberal standards which have been appliel
by the California courts in other subdivisic"
exaction cases. Because the Virginia Supreme
Court has never ruled on the validity of a
specific subdivision exaction, the standards
that would be applied in such a situation
remain a matter of conjecture. However, this
should not preclude further study in the possible adoption of a statute similar to the

.California one. Given the new mandate that
states developing coastal zone management
plans must provide for planning processes
for insuring adequate public access to beaches
(Coastal Zone Management Act, sec. 305(b)(7)
(1972) as amended by P. L. 94-320 (1976)), the
subdivision exaction may provide an alternative to the expensive process of condemnation
and purchase.

